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ie period from the turn of the century to the outbreak of
first World War was one of pronounced and relatively steady
pansion of industry and trade, interrupted temporarily by the
atractions of 1903-04, 1907-08, 1910 and 1914. The economic
Lportance of manufacturing and trade increased in relation to
Eier productive activities, particularly agriculture. In both manu-
:turing and trade there was a growth in the business assets of
Live and successful enterprises, and the financial structure of
ese companies was strengthened by a slowly advancing price level
r manufactured and other goods.
By and large, the prewar decade was noteworthy for its stability
business financial structure.22 Changes took place, of course,
th the ebb and flow of business activity, but none of them as
lical as those that characterized the financial expansions of 1915-
and the contraction that followed. In general, there was no long-
ne tendency for current assets to grow in relation to fixed assets;
isiness debt tended to maintain a stable relationship with owner-
ip or equity; and throughout the period about one-fourth of all
inufacturing assets and about one-third of all assets of trade enter-
ises were supplied by short- and long-term creditors.
The outbreak of World War I in July 1914 found American en-
rprise contracting operations, and the uncertainties and confusion
ecipitated by the European conflict, together with the accompany-
g crisis in world commodity and exchange markets, added force
the contraction tendencies for another half year. Industrial ac-
'ity, which had declined at the rate of o.6 percent per month over
e year and a half preceding war, fell at an average rate of iper-
in during the five months that followed the outbreak of hostili-
s28 In January 1915 business failures were more numerous than
any time since the turn of the century,24 and the U. S. Steel
)rporation reported that shipments in November and December
14 were the lowest in the history of the corporation. Among other
clustries experiencing acute depression were railroad equipment,
['he observations of this paragraph are based on Alexander, op. cit.
:omputed by the compound interest rule, using three-month averages centered on
1913,July1914andDecember 1914,fromBabson's index of the physical
ume of business activity.
to the Insolvency Index issued by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
25machinery manufacture and railroad transportation —industr:
that in another year or two were to find themselves producing,
an effort to fill the war orders of belligerents, at rates that tax
their productive capacity.
Disrupted production and accelerated consumption caused Em
pean belligerent nations, early in 1915,toreich out into world m:
kets f9r supplies. The influx of war orders into the United
acted first to prevent further recession, then as a stimulus to exp2
sion. Led by a revival of activity in heavy industries and in thi
producing clothing, food and supplies adaptable to military
poses, recovery spread rapidly. By the end of that year 'manufacti
ing output had exceeded its prewar peak; industrial employme
and payrolls had attained new highs; trade was flourishing; a
farmers were again making profits.
World War I thus came at a time when American business ent
prise in general was accumulating unused capacity as a result
economic recession, and the more rapid contraction that follow
the outbreak of war widened this margin still further. Fixed p:
ductive assets —land,plant and equipment —wererelatively abt
dant, while current or working assets —inventories,receivables a
cash or equivalent —wererelatively scarce. This condition, typb
after a period of extended liquidation, was intensified by the shai
ness of the wartime revival, which further depleted current ass
—inmanufacturing, for financing the conversion from peace to IA
production;in trade, for financing the enlargement of sales
ties to meet the increase in consumer demand.
In these the immediate financing problem of bi
ness enterprise was to build up working assets to facilitate
level wartime operations, and the problem was soon render
more acute by the rise in prices, which set in in 1915a
quickly inflated the value of assets subject to rapid turnover.-Whe
as during the last three major expansions preceding World Wa
the structure of assets in manufacturing and trade ha'd been co
paratively stable, showing only a moderate increase of current
sets in relation to fixed assets, the World War I expansion quid
altered conventional standards regarding the balance between
asset groups.25
The pressure to expand current assets was soon reinforced
25SeeAlexander, op. cit.
26ressure to expand fixed assets, while the problem of financing this
was made more acute by the wartime advance in prices.
rhe result was an exaggerated increase of all business assets, which
:ontinued through the war years 1915-18 and the two postwar years
[9 19-20. The percentage increases per year in current assets, fixed
)roperty and total assets, and in wholesale prices, for the periods
[ABLE 1—PERCENTAGE INCREASE PER YEAR. IN CURRENT








. 1915-18 1919-20 1922-29 1933-37
SAMPLES
Large companies
Cñrrent assets r 30% 2% 5% 4%
Fixed property . 5 10 . 6 —1
Total assets 15 7 6 1











Large companies . .
Current assets 25 27 11 11
Fixed property 8 26 21 2
Total assets 14 15 11 4











All commodities 18 8 C 6
Commodities other than farm
products and food 17 14 —2 4
t Annual percentage increases computed by the compound interest rule from balance
;heet figures, net of valuation reserves, for the terminal dates of each period. Whole-
;ale prices computed by the compound interest rule from average prices of the pre.
:eding and terminal year of each period. "Fixed property" refers to land, plant and
The large corporation samples for the peacetime expansions differ in
:omposition from those for the wartime expansions; for description of the samples
;ee Appendix A.
Average for the period 1917-18 only.
Decrease of less than 0.5
I 271915-18 and 1919-20, are compared in Table i with those of the
peacetime expansions of 1922-29 and 1933-37.
Over the entire wartime period 19 15-20, the relative pace of asset
growth was swifter than in either of the later peacetime expansions,
and it was much more rapid for current assets than for fixed prop-
erty. Price inflation was obviously a major determinant of this more
rapid rate of wartime asset expansion, especially in the case of cur-
rent assets, which have the higher rate of turnover.
The wartime expansion in assets had to be financed by an equal
sum of dollars. The next section deals 'with this financing problem
in detail; for the moment, two preliminary observations may be
offered. First, all possible sources of funds were tapped by manu-
facturing and trade enterprise to finance such expansion —trade
creditors, commercial banks, the securities market (by means of
bond and stock issues), and undistributed earnings. Second, many of
the critical financial problems encountered by business enterprise
in the first postwar recession can be traced to the expedients used to
finance asset expansion over the 1915-20 period.
Current Assets
Indexes of wartime changes in current and total assets are shown
in Chart 1. The increase in current assets 'of manufacturing and
trade corporations up to the end of hostilities was substantial in
both of our size samples, but was greater for the samples of large
companies than for those of medium and small cOncerns.28 The
greater rate of current asset expansion of the large corporations
than of the medium and small enterprises (as shown by Chart i
and Table i) reflects the more rapid expansion of large companies'
sales under wartime influences.
•Current assets not only grew quickly, but became a greater part
of total assets, particularly in the large companies. At the end of
1916 the current assets of large manufacturing and trade corpora-
tions amounted to 38 percent of total assets; by year-end 1918 the
proportion had risen to about 48 percent. Among medium and
small manufacturing corporations the rise was from 47 toper-
26 This observation concerning the aggregate behavior of major size-industry groups
is confirmed by the behavior of the majority of individual companies in our samples.
Throughout the various size-industry groups the degree of current asset expansion of
individual companies was high, in comparison with other asset categories.
28CHART 1—INDEXES OF TOTAL ASSETS AND CURRENT ASSETS, 1914-22 a
(1916-20 average =ioo)











The samples of large corporations consist of a varying number of identical manu-
acturing concerns, averaging about 8 identical trade concerns engaged in
nass distribution. The Wisconsin samples of medium and small corporations consist
f 73 identical manufacturing concerns, andidentical trade concerns; data on these
ompanies are not available for the years before 1916. Subsequent charts, and also the






















'20 '22 1914 'IS 'IS '20 '22cent; while among medium and small trade companies it was onl'
from 79 to 8o percent.
During the postwar expansion of 1919-20the current assets o
manufacturing and trade continued to increase. For large manu
facturing concerns the rise was moderate by comparison with tha
of the war years and of interbellum expansions; for the other group
it was pronounced, particularly in medium and small manufactin
ing and trade concerns. During 1919 large
companies were converting plant and equipmelit back to peacetim
production; a process that checked current asset growth; but trad
companies and the smaller manufacturers, with few if any prob
lems of plant conversion, responded at mice to consumer demand
swollen by increased wartime incomes and deferred during the wa:
emergency. Furthermore, current assets oftradecompanies, whici
c9ntained a larger inventory component, were carried upward oi
the postwar wave of rising prices for finished goods, that reache
its crest early in 1920.
The financing requirements arising from the growth of curren
assets during wartime and peacetime expansions may be gauge
roughly for our samples by expressing each year's increase in cur
rent assets, adjusted for revaluations, in percent of total assets a
the beginning of the year. Such percentages, c mputed by periods
are presented hiTable2. That table shows that the additions t
corporate resources resulting from the flow of funds into curren
assets were larger during the World War I. expansions than
TABLE 2—EXPANSION OF CURRENT ASSETS IN PERCENT OF










Large companies 11% 1% • 2% 2%
Medium and small cos. (Wisc.) bc 12 3 1
TRADE SAMPLES
Large companies 10 14 7 5
Medium and small cos. (Wisc.) lie 6 • 1
a See text footnote 27. For description of the samples see Appendix A.
b Exclusive of 1924 and 1927.
CAveragefor 1917-18 only.
.30I. '1
ie subsequent peacetime expansions, with the single exception
f large manufacturing concerns, 19 19.20.27 Available data sug-
est that the wartime current asset additions to corpprate resources
rere large also, on the average, in comparison with the prewar cx-
ansions of 1904-07, igo8-io, and 1912.13.28
riven tory
riventory is ordinarily the largest component of current assets in
ianufacturing and trade; consequently, marked changes in total
unent assets arise chiefly from changes in inventory. Chart 2 shows
idexes of inventory at book value for our four primary industry-
ize samples, and also compares them with indexes for other avail-
ble samples. For large corporations the supplementary indexes are
ased on samples collected by the Division of Research of the Board
f Governors of the Federal Reserve System29 and by Dun & Brad-
treet, Inc.30 For medium and small corporations the supplementary
idex represents a smaller sample of identical Massachusetts corn-
anies. The supplementary samples differ from our primary indus-
ry-size samples in industrial coverage and weighting, and therefore
hey reveal somewhat different movements.
Over the entire wartime period 1915-20 the indexes on the whole
,oint to the same fact, a rapid accretion in book value of business
nventory. For the shorter period 1915-18 the large cOmpanies and
he smaller trade companies showed a marked increase in dollar
In preparing this and following tables in which asset, liability and net worth
ianges, adjusted foi write-ups and write-downs, appear as percentages àf total assets,
ie aggregate amount of such change over the period was divided by the aggregate
)tal assets as of the beginning of each included in the period. This method
Lelds a weighted average of percentage increase or decrease in relation to previous
ear total assets, and permits the use of a varying number of companies from year
) year. Such variation in coverage is caused by omissions, in certain years, of essen-
al data from the published financial statements of individual companies. Moreover,
coverage of the large corporation differs somewhat as between the war-
me and peacetime expansions. For manufacturing, 47 of the Si large companies in
m 1915-22 sample are included in the 1920-39 sample of 84 companies; for trade,
of the 8 companies in the first sample are also among the io of the second sample.
Several samples of prewar corporate financial data assembled for the Financial
hesearch Program's Studies in Business Financing are collected in a source volume,
for Studies in Business Financing, 1900.42 (ms. '943).
George Terborgh, "Manufacturing Inventories During and After the World War,"
ederal Reserve Bulletin (July 1941) pp. 613-17.
) Helen Brown Russell and Willard L. Thorp, "Inventories During the World War,"
pun's Review (February '94o) pp. 17-22.
3'CHART2— INDEXESOFYEAR-END BOOK VALUE OF INVENTORY,
(1916-20 average=ioo)
SAM PLESOF' LARGECORPORATIONS
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
INDEX
















MASSACHUSETTS SAMPLE WISCONSIN SAMPLE
a The Massachusetts samples consist of39 identicalmanufacturingconcernsand
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'lb 'IS 120 '22 1914 'IC '18 '20 '22ventory, but among the smaller manufacturing companies, espe-
iily those in the Wisconsin sample, this was true only through
17, their inventory expansion having slowed down considerably
1918.This'leveling out was found also for 1919intwo of the
iiples of large companies, but the Federal Reserve sample con-
rued to show a rise in that year. The 1920 rise in large corporation
ventory is confirmed by each of the samples. The inventory in-
xes of the two medium and small company samples, although
cy moved in the same direction during the war, diverged consid-
ibly in the postwar years, especially among manufacturing cor-
rations. This postwar divergence reflects differences in the vol-
ae and character of business activity in the two states from which
e samples were drawn, and also differences in the industrial com-
sition of the samples.
The industries represented in our samples showed a consistent
ttern of inventory expansion through i918,with more uniform-
among the large corporations than among the medium and
Lall ones (Chartsand 4).31Considerablevariation was evident
1919,butin 1920therew3s again a high degree of consistency.
the large corporation sample, durable and non-durable goods
dustries expanded inventory atabout the same rate up to 1918;
ventory expansion of durable goods producers was checked in
19butrose sharply the following year, while inventory of non-
irable goods producers continued to rise in 1919,andagain,
ough at a slower rate, in 1920.32
rherewas also a substantial degree of uniformity in the behavior of individual
teems, 1915-20. In the large manufacturing sample, 52outof 75 companies a-
idedtheir inventory in 74out ofin 1916; 8i out of 85 in 1917;69out of
in 1918;46out of 86 in and 6' out of 82 in 1920. Inthe large trade sample,
utof 7 companies expanded their inventory in 1915;7out of 8 in igi6, '917 and
8; 4 out of 8 in igtg; and 6 out of 8 in 1920.
the medium and small companies the year-to-year uniformity of behavior
;h regard to inventory was not so great as among the large concerns. In manufac-
ing the number of medium and small companies that expanded their inventory
Idings was as follows: 48 out of 68 in 47 out of 73 in igi8; 46 out of 75 in
g; 58 out of 77 in 1929. For trade the figures are: i8 out of 22in 22outof
in 1918;15 out of 29 1919;20 outof in 1920.
For the four years 1915,igi8,1919 and 1920 the indexes of inventory book value
)16-2o =ioo)were as follows: in durable goods industries, 46, 111, 107, 128; in
ri-durable goods industries, 45, 109,120, 124. Terborgh'sindexes of durable and
n-durable goods inventory for a large sample of corporations indicate the same




CHART 3—INDEXES OF YEfl-END BOOK VALUE OF INVENTORY,
Samples of Large Corporations in Eleven Manufacturing Industri
and in Trade, 1914-22
(1916-20average =ioo)
THE INTERVALS ON THE VERTICAL SCALE






















aFor description of the samples see Appendix A.
34




'15 '16 '17 '18 '19 '20 '21 ICHART 4— INDEXES OF YEAR-END BOOK VALUE OF INVENTORY,
amples of Medium and Small Corporations in Eight Manufacturing













'15 '16 '17 '18 '19 '20 '21 1922
uFor description of the samples see Appendix A.
35Some of the war period increase in the book value of manufac-
turing and trade inventory took place because a greater physical
stock of inventory was maintained in anticipation of threatened
material shortages and transportation bottlenecks, and in support
of a larger volume of operations; some was the result of shifts in the
character of goods produced. At least half of it, however, was the
result of price inflation. Wholesale prices rose rapidly from the end
of 1915 to May 1920, when the all-commodity index of the U. S
Bureau of Labor Statistics attained a peak i 41 percent higher than
the average fori 915. Although the upward movement of prices
was general, prices of individual commodities rose in varying de-
gree, and thus affected differently the book value of inventory of
individual manufacturers, wholesalers and retailers. Prices of semi-
manufactured goo4s experienced the greatest rise, with raw mate-
rial prices second and finished goods not far behind.
Chart 5 shows the movement of the inventory indexes for large
corporations, adjusted and unadjusted for price changes, and the
comparable indexes of wholesale prices.33 Between 1915 and 1920
large manufacturing companies showed steady increases in their
physical inventory (as represented by the deflated book value of
inventory); for large trade companies there were sizable increases
in 1916 and 1918 and a sharp rise in 1920.
The postwar expansion of physical inventory is of special interest.
The speculative conditions that came to prevail, accentuated by
delivery and transportation delays, gave rise to the practice of plac-
ing duplicate orders with two or more independent suppliers, and
in some lines this practice became widespread. Furthermore, these
same conditions led to an extension of forward commitments, i. e.3
an acceleration of forward ordering, from both domestic and for-
eign buyers. The accumulation of physical inventory by manufac-
turing and trade in this situation must have been a factor in
33 In deflating manjifacturing inventory, price indexes developed by the Bureau ol
Labor Statistics for individual industry groups were employed; the deflation was car
out separately for each industry, using a price average based on the nuniber ol
months that inventory is ordinarily held, and the index was calculated from th
aggregate of the deflated inventory values. In deflating trade inventory, the price
index for finished commodities was employed, using the price average indicated
the inventory turnover ratio. No deflation of the inventory book value of the mediurt
and small corporation samples was attempted, because of the absence of suitable pric4
indexes for the specific industries represented.
36CHART 5—INDEXES OF. CURRENT AND DEFLATED BOOK VALUE OF
Samples of Large ManufacturIng and Trade Corporations,
and Indexes of Wholesale Prices, 1914-22 a
(1916-20average =100)
INDEXESOF INVENTORY





















For the methods used in deflating inventory, see text footnote
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For description of the samplesthe postwar inflation of wholesale prices, for manufacturing outpu'
in 1919-20 was below that of 1917-18. At the same time, however
the sharp advance in prices that took place in 1919-20, as well as thi
growth in physical inventory; operated to sustain the rise in thi
book value of inventory.
By the nature of business processes the dollar volume of inven
tory holdings is closely related to the dollar volume of sales. In thi
absence of any marked change in the operating conditions of
given industry, the ratio between these two accounts will sho%
little or no upward or downward trend; it is characterized, how
ever, by a short-run instability that stems in part from the financia
policy of the enterprise and jn part from the difficulty of
inventory purchases exactly to sales as business conditions change
During the wartime expansions the movement of the inventory turn
over rate (sales divided by average year-end inventory), influence
by short-run factors, differed considerably among our industry-siz
samples (Chart 6). But the principal contrast in behavior was bc
tween the size groups. For the large corporation samples a
tendency characterized inventory turnover from 1916 throug]
1920, although in trade the fall was interrupted in 1919 by a mod
erate rise; in i 916 turnover was more rapid for manufacturing, les
rapid for trade, than it had been1915. For the medium am
small company groups, on the other hand, inventory turnover fel
from igi6 to and then rose to a peak in 1920.
The striking difference, during the postwar expansion, betweei
the movements of inventory turnover for the large and the mediur
and small company samples seems to indicate a less conservative ir
ventory policy on the part of larger concerns. This was possibly th
case in 1919, when large manufacturers and distributors were prol
ably stimulated to make abnormal purchases as a matter of protec
don against threatened a speculation on futur
price rises. The same motives doubtless continued to operate in th
first part of 1920, but in the spring of that year consumer resistanc
34Forthe medium and small, company samples an inventory-sales ratio for tgi6 basc
on average year-end inventory could not be computed, as data on the years befo:
1916atenot available. It may be assumed, however, that this ratio decreased betwe
1916and1917,asthe ratio based on single year-end inventory decreased between the:
years, and ratios calculatedthese two ways indicate the same general pattern
movement.CHART6—INDEXES OF AVERAGE TURNOVER AT BOOK VALUE AND OF
SALES, 1915-22, AND INVENTORY TURNOVER RATES a
(1916-20 average =ioo)
INVENTORY ——a SALES ...... TURNOVER


























.nventory indexes are based on averages of year-end data for two consecutive years.
tventory turnover rates represent sales divided by average year-end inventory. For


































1915'18'Il'18 '19'20'21'22to higher retail prices began to make itself felt:35 In trade, consum4
buying below expectations meant rising inventory holdings in rel
tion to sales, and this condition was soon, by cancellation of ordei
transmitted back to manufacturing concerns.36
In the last half of 1920 the curtailment of consumer buying an
widespread cancellation of orders by both foreign and domest
buyers were undoubtedly major factors in physical and book vali
inventory accumulation. Late that year the Chamber of Commeri
of the State of New York made an investigation of cancellation
and found them greater in volume than ever before, especially
lumber and in various highly competitive consumer goods lines,
Reputable concerns in these circumstances were confronted with
dilemma. Ib many cases, the enforcement of contracts to sell e:
tailed converting inventory into receivables that might, become bE
debts. Commitments to buy, on the other hand, involved a co
cern's credit standing in the trade, future as well as current, ar
could not be lightly repudiated by responsible domestic corpor
tions. One large rubber concern —theGoodyear Tire & Rubb
Company —inits reorganization plan of i 920 set up a reserve
$24 million to cover losses on its commitments for future delivery.
Manufacturing companies, whose postwar prosperity dëpencli
heavily on foreign orders, were especially vulnerable, to cancell
lion of orders, since foreign buyers did not feel the same degri
of responsibility in fulfilling commitments.
The advance in inventory book value during the war era w
bound to have far-reaching effects on the operating results of bu:
ness enterprise as well as on its financial structure. In manufactu
ing, for example, substantial short-run profits resulted from the pi
35 For a discussion of consumer buyipg resistance in this period see the Report of t
Joint Commission of Agricultural Inquiry, 67th Congress, House Report No. 44
Credit) Part II, pp. 45-46; also Alexander P. Noyes, The War Period of Americ
Finance, 1908-1925 (New York 1936) pp. 333-34; Wilson F. Payne, Business
1919-1922, School of Business, University of Chicago (1942) pp. 62-63 and 1o9-i1; a:
William Hoyt Moore, Post-Armistice Industrial Developments, 1918 -1920, U. S. Bure
of Labor Statistics, Study No.(January 1943) pp. 38-42.
36 See Noyes,cit., pp. 395-96; also Payne, op. cit., Chapters Ill-VIlI, pp. 55 if.
37 Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York, "Cancellations," Monthly
(November 1920) pp. i-8 and 34-35.
38 See the court testimony of George 0. May on the Goodyear reorganization of
reprinted in his Twenty-five Years of Accounting Responsibility, 1911-36 (Americ
Institute Publishing Co., New York, 1936) I, pp. 291-316.
40Jing practice of charging raw materials into process on some
basis, which, though including provision for valuation
erves in many cases, more nearly approximated the first-in, first-
t ("fifo") method oE pricing inventory than any other.3° Such
)rt-run profits arose out of the time lag occurring between the
rchase of the raw material and the sale of the finished product. So
ig as the trend of prices continued upward, and manufacturers
followed procedures similar to the first-in, first-out method
valuation, the upward price spiral was bound to generate book
)fits; but when the upswing of prices was replaced by a down-
ing, beginning at the middle of i 920 and extending through 1921,
was equally inevitable that the write-down of inventory holdings
)uld be a source of exceptional book losses. Similar book profits
ci losses arose for trade concerns; although trade procedure in
:ounting for inventory, known as the retail method, differed
newhat from the procedure current in manufacturing, as a mat-
Ic different results that may be obtained in a period of rising prices from alterna-
methods of valuing manufacturing inventory may be seen from the following
iparison of the first-in, first-out ("fifo") method and the last-in, first-out ("lifo")
hod. In principle, average cost methods are more nearly related to the first-in,
-out basis of inventory valuation and over time yield a roughly similar pattern
'esults.
'he first-in, first-out method assumes that materials are withdrawn from stock in
same order as they are purchased and at the original purchase price. Thus, in a
[od of rising prices, materials moving from stock into production are priced at
er figures than are newly purchased materials moving into stock. Therefore the
in the cost of goods manufactured lags behind the rise in the price of finished
ds, and profits as well as inventory values are inflated by advancing prices. The
)unt of the lag (and of the resulting profit differential) obviously depends upon
size of inventory, its rate of turnover, and the amount of price change.
lie use of the last-in, first-out method of valuation, according to which materials
idrawn from stock are priced at the most recent acquisition cost, yields in a
od of rising prices a higher cost of goods sold anda lower value for inventory on
d, that is, a smaller short-run book profit, than the first-in, first-out method. For an
resting discussion of the comparative results obtained by the use of the first-in,
-out, last-in, first-out, and average-cost methods of inventory valuation, see Charles
aa, Effectof InventoryMethods on Calculation of Profits and Income Taxes,
versity of Illinois, Bureau of Economic and Business Research, Bulletin No. 63
iruary 1943).
uringthe period of war and postwar price inflation, a few large set up
•ation reserves for the difference between the current cost of inventory on hand
some average prewar cost, charging a like amount either to a loss account or to
of goods sold, and thereby reducing both the book value of their inventory and
amount of their operating profits.
41ter of operating practice the trade method appears to have th
;much the same results.4°
A substantial number of large concerns, in anticipation of a su
sequent decline in prices, established or increased inventory i
serves, charging the amount of such reserve provision against th
war and postwar profits. A. few of the more conservatively financi
companies, such as the United States Steel and International H2
vester Corporations, valued inventories in reports to stockholdc
at prewar prices and carried the difference between these values at
cost as inventory reserves; other large companies included provish
for inventory revaluation as part of their contingency reserves. Mc
inventory reserves, however, were inadequate, and many ofii
medium and small companies —perhapsthe majority of them —d
little about the matter. In consequence, a large number of man
facturing and trade companies found themselves suddenly fac
with substantial operating losses when prices declined in
A total of 31 large manufacturing companies for which invento
revaluation data are available (2 i of which are included in our sai
pie) reported inventory write-downs of $115 million for 1920, OP
percent of the value of their inventory holdings at the beginning
the year. In regard to large trade companies it is not possible to c
tamfrom published data an adequate impression of the extent
1920 inventory write-downs; we do know, however, that 2 of the
companies in our sample had write-downs totaling $8 million, or
percent of inventorythe beginning of the year. It is notewort
that only one of the companies in our samples of medium and sni
manufacturing and trade corporations indicated inventory wri
downs in 1920. Companies that did not take inveStory losses
write-downs of course absorbed them in the cOst of goods sold.
Quick Assets
The. sharp expansion of business inventory was an outstanding f
ture of corporate financial development during the war and PC
war years. But the increase in quick assets —cash,marketable se4
rides and receivables —wasalso abnormally large between iç
and 1920 if that period is compared with the subsequent peacetil
40 See report prepared by the American Institute of Accountants Committee
Cooperation with Controller's Congress of the National Retail Dry Goods Associat:
"The Last-in, First-out Inventory Basis," Journal of Accountancy (February H
pp.146-54, especially p. 148.
42expansions of 1922-29 and 1933-37, or with expansions between
1904 and i 913 (according to such fragmentary evidence as is avail-
able).Insome industries —suchas steel, meat packing, transporta-
tion equipment, and building materials —quickasset expansiOn was
relatively greater than the increase in inventory.
The growth in quick assets of our samples during the World
War I expansions is compared in Chartwith the growth of in-
ventory. (While inventory may be considered as part of quick as-
sets in trade, we exclude it here for purposes of comparison with
manufacturing industry.) Over the war years i 915:18 all four in-
dustry-size groups added substantially to both items, but the smaller
corporations showed a greater increase in inventory than in quick
assets.41 This difference reflects the larger companies' more rapid
wartime increase in sales and profits, a spurt that, among manu-
facturing concerns, was due largely to war orders for munitions
and supplies, and, among trade concerns, resulted from a prompt
response to rising prices and volume of consumer demand. During
the postwar expansion the quick assets of large manufacturers de-
clined while their inventory increased. For the Other groups, how-
ever, both quick assets and inventory —particularlyquick assets —
underwentfurther expansion, benefiting from the consumer buying
wave of 1919-20; while the dollar sales of large manufacturers lev-
eled off in 1918 and failed to rise in 1919 or 1920, the other groups
enjoyed a substantial growth in their sales in the latter years.
The wartime increases in corporate resources resulting from the
investment of funds in quick assets and in inventory exceeded those
of the interbellum expansions. This is clear from Table3, which
compares the increase in these accounts, in percent of total assets
at the beginning of the year, on a weighted annual average basis.
In all four industry-size groups both accounts made a larger average
percentage addition to total assets in 1915-18 than in either of the
postwar peace expansions. The 1919-20 period showed some irregu-
larity among the samples, but over the 19 15-20 period as a whole
41 Among an average oflarge manufacturing companies included in our sample,
42in1915-18and48 in 1919-20expandedtheir inventory in relation to their quick
assets; for the large trade concerns the proportions were 5 out of 8 in ig15-18and 4
out of 8 in 1919-20.Amongthemedium and small manufacturing companies, the
number expanding inventory in relation to quick assetsamounted toin 1917-iS
and32 in 1919-20;foran average of 30mediumand small trade concerns the propor-
tionswere 23 19z7-z8and 14 in 1919-20.



















































'iø '16 '20 '22 1914 '18 '20 '22one or both items produced sizable increases in total assets for all
groups. I
TABLE3—EXPANSION OF QUICK ASSETS AND OF INVENTORY,








. 1915-18 1919-20 1922.2gb 1933-87
MANuFACruRING SAMPLES
Large companies
•Quick assets 6% —1% 1% C
Inventory 5 2 1 2%











Quick assets 3 6 2 2
Inventory 7 8 5 8









aSee text footnote 27. For description of the samples see Appendix A.
b Exclusive of 1924 and 1927.
c Less than 0.5 percent.
dAverage for 1917-18 only.
An analysis of changes in the various components of quick assets
(Chart 8) reveals, for each of our samples, a notable growth of re-
ceivables, cash and marketable securities over the wartime period
as a whole, though during the war itself the increases were more
consistent for large corporations, and less consistent for smaller
concerns, than during the postwar expansion. Receivables consti-
tuted the largest part of quick assets at the outset of the war expan-
Sion —roughlythree-fifths among the large manufacturing and
trade corporations,, three-quarters among the medium and small
manufacturing companies, and four-fifths among medium and small
trade companies. For the trade groups, however, the relative im-
portance of receivables declined through i 919, and for manufac-
turing through 1920.
The increase in cash balances shown by our samples between
1915 and 1919 or 1920 suggests that a significant change in the own-
45CHART 8— INDExES OF CASH, RECEIVABLES, AND MARKETABLE
SECURITIES,
(1916-20 average =too)
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a Fordescription of the samples see Appendix A.
25of bank deposits may have been associated with the wartime
iflation process. During 1915-18thetotal deposits of all banks rose
a per annum rate of 13percent,and demand deposits at a rate
ii percent; in 19 19-20 both categories showed an average in-
ease of 8 percent.42 Up to i 918 the cash balances of our large cor-
Dration samples (manufacturing and trade combined) increased
ster than demand deposits of all banks (Chart 9), but then. they
veled off and declined as these companies drew down their cash
L order to finance fixed property expansion, war profits taxes and
Dstwar inventory accumulation; but total demand deposits con-
nued to rise into i 920. In contrast, the smaller corporations' in-
ease in cash balances appears to have maintained a fairly steady
to the growth of demand deposits.
These sample data suggest that cash balances of large manufac-
iring and trade corporations may have grown ffiore rapidly than
)nsumer and other business balances through i 918, and that from
18 to i 920 a change in the opposite direction occurred. Since such
change may have been an important factor in the development
F the postwar boom, it needs to be confirmed by 4ata relating to
large manufacturing and trade corporations (defined here as
iose with total assets in excess of $5 million). Estimates indicate
iat cash balances of this entire group represented about 7 percent
F the $12 billion of demand deposits of all banks at the end of
8 percent of the $15 billion of deposits in igi8, and 8 percent
[the $18 billion outstanding at the end of In other words,
ish balances of all large manufacturing and trade companies grew
iore rapidly than demand deposits from 1916 to 1918, and at about
Computed by the compound interest rule, from interpolated year-end adjusted
deposits.
An estimate of the number of manufacturing and trade corporations with total
setsof million and $io—50 million was obtained for the yearsigi6,
i8 and 1920 by adjusting the number of companies listed in the 1923 Moody's
anual of Investments for change in asset size during the period 1915-20. The esti-
ated number of companies for each year was then multiplied by the average amount
cash holdings of companies in the same size groups, as determined from samples
companies listed in Moody's Manuals for igi6, 1918 and 1920. To determine cash
)Idings of manufacturing corporations of a total asset size of $50 million and over,
1 such companies listed in Moody's in 1916, igi8 and 1920 were included; but for trade
ncerns of that size it was necessary, because of the small number of large trade
ncerns whose statements were published in Moody's, to follow the same procedure
for the manufacturing and trade concerns in the $5—5o million total asset group.
47the same rate from 1918 to 1920. The difference between this fin
ing for the latter period and that for our sample in the same yea
reflects an increase in the numb'er of concerns in the large corp
ration class rather than an increase in average cash balance. Tak
together, however, these data suggest that over the entire ward
period there was some shift in deposit ownership in general, a
also a considerable shift in deposit ownership within the popul
don of large corporate enterprises.
When business operations are relatively stable a sharp increa
in corporate cash balances is reflected in a decrease in their rate
turnover, that is, a decline in the number of times a year that t
average amount of cash on hand is spent. Under theinflationa
conditions prevailing through i9117theturnover of average cas
balances of large manufacturing corporations remained relativel
constant, with a slight decline in 1917,whilethat of the large tra
concerns increased somewhat from 1915toi916,and by 1917ha
practically doubled its 1915level(Chart g).44Between1917an
1920 the cash turnover of the large manufacturing corporations i
creased slightly, while that of the large trade concerns decline
through i919, thenrecovered somewhat ini920.The cash tur
over of the medium and small manufacturing corporations move
both up and down during 1917-20 but declined on the whole, whil
that of the medium and small trade companies rose noticeably ii
1919and1920 above the 1917-18level.
The growth in marketable security holdings during the war yeai
was primarily a reflection of Liberty Bond purchases. From a
44Inorder to derive an annual rate of turnover of corporate cash holdings eithé
cash receipts or cash payments may be divided by the average cash balance. F.
periods of stable cash balances the two methods yield the same result;if cash ba
ances are growing the use of total cash payments yields a lower turnover rate tha
cash receipts; if cash balances are declining cash payments yields a higher rate tha
cash receipts.
For Chart g the total of cash payments, as compiled from the sources and uses
funds statements for individual companies, has been employed. Sales minus net [urn
from operations (net income plus non-fund charges to income, such as depreciatioi
depletion, losses on sales of fixed assets, amortization of deferred charges, and ti
like)minus increases in current payables, are assumed to equal operating
paid in cash; to this &re added cash dividends, decreases in current payables, increasi
in assets other than cash and receivables, decreases in long-term debt, and repu
chases of stock. As an estimate of total cafli payments the result of the procedure
admittedly rough, based as itison changes in year-end balances of asset and liabilil
accounts.
48:HART 9—INDEXES OF CASH BALANCES AND OF DEMAND DEPOSITS,
1915-22,ANDTURNOVER RATES OF CASH BALANCES a
(1917-20average =ioo)
INDEX PERCENT
I I I I
CASH BALANCES,





















[ndexes of cash balances are based on averages of year-end data for two consecutive
:ars. Turnover rates of cash balances represent cash payments made during the year,
vided by average year-end cash balances; see text footnote 44. For description of
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'1915'16 '17'IS'19'20'21'22 1915'IS '17 '18'19'20'21'22'ligible sum at the end of 1916,themarketable security holdings
all large manufacturing and trade corporations grew rapidly to
estimated peak of some $1.5 billion in '1919, then declined
around $o.8 billion at the end of 1920. Much of the wartime p
chase of government securities was a patriotic response to war lo
drives and did not reflect a deliberate policy of building up cc
porate liquidity. Some large manufacturing corporations sold g
ernment bonds in 1919 in order to finance the reconversion a
expansion of plant and equipment and the payment of income tax
while in 1920 both large manufacturing and large trade corpo
dons 'drew upon this source to finance inventory expansion and t
payments. In liquidating their government bond holdings in i
and 1920, these companies not only contributed to the break
prices of Liberty Bonds that occurred between mid-i9i9 and mi
1920, but also suffered some losses as a result of this price declin
The medium and small corporations, both in manufacturing an
in trade, were purchasers of government bonds in 1919 and 1920
a further indication of the extent to which the smaller corporatiol
benefited from the postwar boom in consumer buying.
Fixed Property Expenditures and Investments
The production emergency of 19 15-18, like that of the current wa
was met not only by conversion and by more intensive use
plant and equipment, but also by construction of ne
facilities. However, many companies followed the practice of char
ing wartime plant and equipment expenditures, in whole or
part, to current operating expense or to contingency or oth
reserves, and of burying depreciation reserves in other accouni
without fully disclosing such facts in their published statemeni
Moreover, in some industries war contracts provided for contra
advances to finance the cost of special new facilities. Prior to 01
entry into the war, European belligerents financed plant expansic
by this method, obtaining a large part of the funds advanced fro
proceeds of security sales in American markets. Some war contrac
of our own government, 1917-18, provided for new plant
inthis way. For these reasons, any estimate of fixed property e
penditures is necessarily rough. Nevertheless, some judgment
be formed concerning the relative magnitude of such expenditur
in 1915-20 and in the peacetime expansions of 1922-29 and 1933-3
50
-aChart ioshows, for 1915-37,fixedproperty expenditures (change
n net fixed property account plus reported depreciation and de-
)letion accruals) as a percentage of the net fixed property account
tt the beginning of the year —hereaftercalled the fixed property
ratio. During 1915-17(yearsfor which data on the
maller companies are unavailable) the ratio rose for both samples
)f large corporations, thus reflecting the broad influence of expand-
.ng production and trade under wartime stimulus. But in i918war-
:ime priorities, shortages of labor materials and bottlenecks in
ransportation brought about a reduction in the ratio for each
though the decline was small among the large manufactur-
.ng concerns engaged in the output of war materials. For all groups
he ratio recovered to some degree in 1919,andin 1920itattained
.evels in trade and in smaller-scale manufacturing that were un-
during either of the interbellum expansions; even for the
arge manufacturing group it rose almost as high as in the subse-
luent peak years 1929and1937.
Thisrise in the fixed property expenditure ratio during the im-
nediate postwar expansion reflected a large increase in dollar out-
ay for plant and equipment. In current dollars the total fixed
)roperty expenditures of all manufacturing companies reached in
L919-2othehigh-water mark for the entire 1915-37 period.45 It
.s true that actual additions to physical productive facilities were
:onsiderably less than the dollar figures imply, largely because of
:oncurrent price increases; by April 1920theBureau of Labor
;tatistics wholesale price index of building materials had risen 71
)ercent over its 1918 level, and for the whole year 1920 the index
iveraged 52 percent higher than 1918. There is no doubt, however,
hat manufacturing and trade companies made important additions
o their fixed property during the i 919-20period,and particularly
n 1920.
One reason for the postwar expansion of fixed prOperty was the
ifting of resfrictions imposed by wartime priorities and shortages
5 Estimates of plant and eqt.tipment purchases of manufacturing concerns in the
Jnited States during the period 1915-39revealthat the average expenditure during
he war years 1915-18 was $1,468 million, as compared with $2,695 million in 1919-20,
2,159 millionin 1922-29(exclusiveof 1924and1927)and$1,306millionin 1933-37.
ceChawner, op. cit.
51CHART 10— FIXED PROPERTY EXPENDITURES IN PERCENT OF FIXED
PROPERTY ACCOUNT AT BEGINNING OF YEAR, 1915-37 a












SAMPLES or MEDIUM AND SMALL CORPORATIONS (wisc.)
a Seepage 55, footnote a to Table 4
b Excluding the paper industry this figure becomes 20percent;excluding one errat
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Clabor and materials. A more fundamental cause, however, was
te optimism generated by the fact that prices did not recede
riously and were soon advancing under the impact of consumer
'ending and foreign demands for American goods. In addition,
anufacturing expenditures on fixed property were stimulated by
i.e competitive introduction of new models, products, and tech-
)logical processes, some of which had been developed during the
ar years; the process of converting back to peacetime production
have led to higher outlays for plant and equipment, particu-
ny among the large manufacturing companies; and the installa-
on of labor-saving equipment became desirable as an aid in main-
Lining the high wage scales established during the war years.
In trade especially, the phenomenal 1920 rise in fixed property
cpenditures was prompted by the postwar spurt in consumer buy-
Lg,financedpartly from current income and partly from the liqui-
ition of war savings by discharged soldiers and the civilian public.
number of large trade corporations launched ambitious expan-
on programs in that year; mail-order companies and chain stores
Ided many new outlets; and urban department stores substantially
ilarged or modernized their merchandising facilities.
An important question in• this connection is the extent to which
re postwar increase in fixed property expenditures represented
placement deferred from 1917 and 1918.Butwhile it is known
rat a considerable amount of deferred replacement accumulated
the railroad industry, no precise data are available in regard to
ianufacturing, where the question has more significance than it
in trade. Possibly a rough measure of such deferment is the
fount of decrease in the net fixed property account.4° Out of a
•mple of 50 large manufacturing companies for which deprecia-
on data are available, 35 postponed the full maintenance of their
Decreases in the net fixed property account result not only from deferred replace-
but also from the undisclosed sale or retirement of property not fully de-
eciated; from depreciation charges in excess of the actual decline in the value of
assets; and from depreciation charges on assets which the company has
intention of replacing, such as those especially acquired for war production; both
taxation and for pricing purposes amortization rates allowed on munitions and
rnament production facilities were high during and immediately after the World
ar I period. Therefore the amount of decrease in this account is not a very accurate
!asure of deferred replacement, but it some value as a rough indication.
53I
fixedproperty investment ini 917 and 1918,forone reason
another; in 1919-20, on the other hand, all but 3 of these 35 cot
panies reported net increases in their fixed property accour
Among the medium and small manufacturing companies the pi
portion reporting net decreases in 1917-18 was about the same, at
here too there was a conspicuous shift in 1919-20. In most cas
however, the amount of decrease in net fixed property account w
small, and thus this measure would indicate that the volume
deferred replacement at the end of 1918 was not very great. Nev
theless, if the. war had continued for several more years the acc
mulation of deferred replacement would probably have constitut
a sizable sum for manufacturing industry as a whole, and the pro
lem of maintaining the productivity of plant facilities would ha"
attained major importance.
Further information on the fixed property accounts of manufa
luring and trade enterprise during the World War I expansions
provided by the figures in Table 4. In that table the investment pc
centages differ from those for expenditures in that they are excl
sive of depreciation and depletion accruals, that is, of capital co:
sumption. It should be noted that differences between the expenc
tures and the investment percentages, as found from one expansic
period to another, reflect changes in accounting practice with regai
to depreciation and depletion charges, as well as the increase
those charges attendant on the growth in fixed property.
For each of the four industry-size groups the investment ratio
well as the expenditure ratio reached a level in the immedia
postwar years that was higher than in any of the other expa
sion periods. The groups of medium and small corporations K
higher average investment ratios in the i915-18 expansionthan
that of 1922-29, and for the large manufacturing companies ti
ratici was the same in the two periods; but the investment ratio
the large trade sample, although its extremely high level of 1919-
wasnot approached in either interbellum expansion, was marked
higher in the 1922-29 period than it had been during 1915-18.
appears that the postwar period ushered in an era of accelerat
growth in large-scale retailing, a corollary of the increasing imp
tance of distribution in the national economy. The average inve
ment ratios for the 1933-37expansioncontrast sharply with thc
of both wartime expansions and also with those of the 1922-
54BLE 4—FIXEDPROPERTY EXPENDITURES AND INVESTMENT









1915-18 1919-20 1922-29b 1933-37
IuFAauIuNG SAMPLES
Arge companies
Expenditures 8% 12% 11% 8%
Investment 4 7 4 1










Expenditures 13 39 28 8
Investment 8 30 22 1








r each year the figures are exclusive of the companies that did not report depreci-
i-i in that year. Fixed property investment represents the change in land, plant and
Lpment account, net of depreciation reserves. Fixed property expenditures represent
stment plus depletion and depreciation accruals. For the World War 1 period
published financial statements, were in almost every case insufficiently detailed
permit of adjustments for retirements of fixed property, or for profits or losses
fling therefrom. The large corporation samples for the peacetime expansions
in composition from those for the wartime expansions; for description of the
pies see Appendix A.
clusive of 1924 and 1927.
erage for1917-18only.
eludingthe predominant industry (paper), expenditures and investments become
nd 9 percent respectively; exéluding one paper corporation with erratic behavior,
ratios become 18 and 10 percent respectively.
iod: while the large manufacturing and trade companies failed
contract their fixed property investment in the expansion of the
s, even in that group the average thcpansion was of, nominal pro-
lions. For the two wartime expansions and for that of 1922-29
expenditure ratio could be described in almost exactly the same
y as the investment ratio.
)n the whole, the available evidence indicates that the military
teriel of World War I was produced to a great extent with
tipment on hand at the beginning of the war, and that additions
manufacturing facilities, though substantial, were not abnor.
55mally large. But the outburst of domestic and foreign spending t
followedthe termination of hostilities was translated by enterp
into property expansion programs, commitments for which
enteredinto and carried through at the top of the postwar pi
inflation. While there were some property writedowns in 1921
most of the war and postwar additions to the value of produci
facilities were apparently carried forward on the books at origi
cost, even though the reproduction cost at the level of prices of
'2 OS, was substantially lower. Wartime tax laws permitted accelera
depreciation on war-built plant and facilities, but the amou,nt
to be fixed after the war, when actual economic obsolescence co
be determined under normal peacetime conditions. Writedoi
on such property therefore occurred over the early '20s when
allowances had been established and approved.47
47SeeBrown and cpattemonop. cit., pp.630-36,especially pp. 634-35.Acceler
depreciation was allowed on war constructed facilities having a total value amountir
some $672 million under the Revenue Acts of t918 and 1921.
56